---"Missile firings" appear over-rated. Generally SAMs (a "land-to-air missile"), aren't used to "easily hit Seoul," as they are used to shoot down air craft and generally have smaller warheads. (There were exceptions when these things were less accurate.)
---Looks like the other missile tests were SILKWORM, anti-ship missiles. Good weapon, but also defensive, rather than offensive, in nature.
---Their SCUD variant launch was a mess. (The Taepodong-1 is a Scud variant. If you don't want a SCUD to go nowhere, don't handle it like the press reported the North Korean People's Army ["NKPA"] did on this last launch.)
---The "nuclear" test will probably turn out to be as unlikely as the last one. (Twenty Kilotons of what explosive?)
---The NKPA used to have a lot of Arty and MRLs on the DMZ and had these Hardened Artillery Sites ("HARTS") that would complicate effective counter fire. Couple of questions come to mind:
1) Do we have UAVs in the Republic of Korea ("ROK"), especially armed Predators, or does the ROK Army have such systems?
2) Did we ever sell the ROK Army the A/N TPQ 37 FIREFINDER Weapon Locating Radar ("Q37")?
3) Do we and the ROK Army have more Q37 and Q36 Radars in-country than we used to? If not, deploy a Target Acquisition Detachment from one of the FA Brigades or from the Target Acquisition Department at the Artillery School at Sill.
4) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") has been broke for years. Have they been firing artillery service practice? If so, since they are gun-heavy (as opposed to howitzer-heavy, lots of 130 mm M-46 and type 59-1s, 122 mm D-74 and 180mm Kokson Guns), then tube-wear is a factor. Have they been re-tubing their guns consistently? Have they just done a mass re-tubing? How are they on ammunition? Any idea of the current mixture of their basic load/unit of fire?
5) What are the conditions of their "Rear Corps," second echelon forces intended to guard the flanks and prevent another Inchon-type landing. Likely a lot worse than in the early 1990s, so does this mean they won't really try (or be able) to go South?
6) How well have they maintained their tank fleet? Have they upgraded their T-55 holdings to Chinese Type 59s or Type 69s? Do they have enough Class IX parts? How about Class III Bulk and Package POL? Have they rotated their stores or is it now all bunker fuel?
7) Any recent up-tic in recon or border crossers?
8) Where are their Kilo Class Subs? How well are they maintained? Those old diesel boats are somewhat effective in the shallow, murky North China Sea.
9) Army and Marine units should review lessons learned from operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan about fighting in hilly terrain. Understand the difference in perception about what constitutes Slow-Go, No-Go and High Speed Avenues of Approach, between Americans and people who grow up in such mountainous terrain. Use of re-trans or Sat-Comm is a big issue. As we tend to be road bound, traffic management is critical.
10) Their self-propelled artillery is all open carriage like our old M-7 105mm or the M110A2 203mm/8 inch gun howitzer. Their mechanized infantry uses open carriage armored personnel carriers (like our old M113 series) rather than infantry fighting vehicles (like the Bradley). Since the terrain is hilly, use by our artillery of HE/Delay or HE/VT, rather than DPICM should be planned for. They tend to place their artillery on level areas on high ground and tend to dig in.
Whole thing sounds like a cry for help. Only potential problem might be the new ROK Government trying to establish a new policy and leaving Kim Jong Il no way out. Keep kicking the can down the road and keep the goofy little guy in Daffy Duck videos and Stoli until he dies, I say.
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