Organizing for America | Emilijan Djindjic's Blog: From Plato to Obama

From Plato to Obama

By Emilijan from Brooklyn, NY - Jul 13th, 2009 at 9:35 pm EDT

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Tags: Articles of Confederation, Bill of Rights, Bradley Effect, congress, Constitution, federalism, liberalism, Obama, Obamania, Plato, tradition, values

The United States is unique among developed nations in defining its raison d’être ideologically. It has been American fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one. American liberalism of the eighteenth century was essentially the rebellion against the monarchical and aristocratic state – against hereditary privilege, against restrictions on bargains. Its Lockean spirit was essentially anarchistic. It was the anti-state. Fighting against a centralized monarchical state the founding fathers distrusted a strong unified government. The first American Constitution – the Articles of Confederation – did not even provide for a federal executive. Authority was placed in Congress, which had limits on its power. The United States of America may be said to be the only country in the world, which was founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian principles – to the power of the Prince.

The chronic antagonism to the state derived from the American Revolution has been institutionalized in the unique division of powers, the internally conflicted form of government that distinguishes the United States from other parliamentary regimes. The United States Constitution aims to prevent the abuse of power by combining two ideas:

1) Separation of powers; and
2) Federalism.

In this post, these two ideas are in the center around which the whole plentitude of other thoughts will attempt to address a set of traditional issues that US Senator Barack Obama helped put at a historical crossroad. Tradition is also the key term to establish the Federalists’ place in a wider context of, predominantly European, socio-economic and political philosophy. This is an attempt to explain logically why certain developments took certain way and more importantly, to identify particular influences on those developments and actors that initiated them before Obama. The set of issues ranges from democracy vs. republic to factionalism, economy, taxation etc. The exploration starts with a historical perspective with frequent detours aiming to provide guidance through over the three and a half millennia of political tradition – the tradition that started with the first preserved written document in Greece in the eighteenth century before Christ and ended being embodied in the Federalist Papers of the eighteenth century A.D. This is how long it took to get to the point when, owing to the this three and a half millennia old political tradition, the dominant political culture embraced values that are believed to be represented by Obama – values such as temperance, tolerance, civility, knowledge and participation that are indispensable for any form of democratic conduct. Or…did the dominant contemporary political culture really embrace such values? Presidential election 2008 is a test for all Americans as some have suggested that Obama may still encounter Bradley effect. The main issue, however, is whether the Constitution advocates these values? One cannot provide a clear-cut definite answer to this question since the Constitution is a living thing, a living document and a subject to indefinite re-interpretation, in totality based upon the will of people. It is widely believed today that the Constitution is a party of “…the traditions from which liberty developed, [and] that tradition is a living thing.” (Justice Harlan (1961) in Poe v. Ullman, United States Supreme Court)

Many believe that Plato inspired the Federalists greatly. He was the first they knew of to devise the idea of state deploying different principles of organization to counter one another and achieve harmony of political factors. He introduced a theory of a mixed state, combining elements of monarchy and democracy. This theory was later developed by Aristotle who envisaged polity as the ideal yet to be achieved. Plato even devised a system of proportional voting. Owing to the Federalists of the eighteenth century, we know this idea as checks and balances. The United States second Constitution is distinguished from all the others in providing for an elaborate system of checks and balances on the executive and the two houses of Congress each of which have different term of office to make concurrence among them difficult. Moreover, the American electorate seems to continue to favor divided government and a weak state. Americans still invariably indicate a preference for small governmental units over large ones. No other government except the Swiss is as limited in powers.

During the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution, two camps of political thought existed. They were the Federalists and anti-Federalists. The Constitution needed the support of both parties if it was to be adopted by the Union. The Federalists wrote the Federalist Papers prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The Papers illustrated how the federal form of government that had been in existence for more than 150 years in the colonies would remain if the Constitution were adopted. “Each State, in ratifying the Constitution is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all the others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal and not a national Constitution “, Madison wrote in 1787. (Federalist: No. 3) He truly believed that large constituencies would provide better representatives. He noted, however, that if constituencies were too large the representatives would be “too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests.” That was the rationale behind his support of the idea of federalism as the means for addressing that issue in the very beginning when it was still benign.

Fear of governmental power, however, was a part of a larger concern to prevent one section of the community dominating. In American politics, the guarantee of a republican form of government to each state was written to prevent the federal government from extending or construing its Constitutional rights of powers in such a manner as to invade the areas of that was to remain under the sovereignty of the individual free states. This clause prevents the federal government from consolidating the free states into one national state. Thus, the confederation of free states will always be known as “The United States of America” and not as “The United State of America”. (Hamilton., A. (1788) Federalist: No. 84) The clause was written to protect the equal right of all citizens within a state to determine the way they would manage their life and property. Jefferson believed this clause was the most important one. He stated, “No provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to man than that, which protects the rights of conscience against the power of its public functionaries.” (Jefferson, T. (1809) Letter to the Methodist Episcopal Church in New London, CT, Feb. 4) Yet, the anti-Federalists were afraid that future generations might not know the differences between the two forms and that the future leaders in the government might construe clauses in the Constitution to justify that they had power that extended into the states where they could then regulate the trade and conduct of individual citizens.

This is where I think would be a good place to make a detour in an attempt to identify Locke and Smith behind then dominant political semantics and economic ideas. Locke advocated for life, liberty, and property and that all men were created equal. That idea that came to life through the Constitution resonated even before its adoption in the mindset of every common citizen that mattered at the time – white man with property.

The Federalists, therefore, needing the votes of the anti-Federalists, entered into a compromise in order that the proposed Constitution could be passed. In the compromise the anti-Federalists were not allowed to put anything inside of the Constitution concerning individual rights because the Constitution was meant to be strictly as a federal document of law – it pertained only to the rights given to the government by the people. They were allowed, however, to place outside the Constitution the set of articles that reflected certain rights of all citizens and of the state that were not to be voided or impaired by the federal government under this form of republican government. The importance of those articles – The Bill of Rights – represented by the first ten amendments of the Constitution adopted in 1791 demonstrated suspicion that political power threatened individual liberty. However, beside Hamilton’s opposition to the Bill of Rights, greatest eye-opener was in the realm of economy in terms of the influence of Smith who emphasized the role of a market economy in establishing and preserving political and personal liberty. By doing so, Smith predisposed Hamilton’s pro-regulated and yet pro-lasses-faire stance on socio-economic liberal theory. Hamilton was a young man when Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776. In 1787, Hamilton defended the case against restricting the federal tax to particular objects by saying this could cause oppression of particular branches of industry and an unequal distribution of the taxes. (Federalist: No. 35) In language echoing Smith’s ideas, Hamilton also warned that restricting the federal power to tax to imports creates incentive for smuggling. He also displayed familiarity with Smith’s ideas when, while underlining Confederation’s defects, he argued for a direct federal taxation. (Federalist: No. 21) In addition, Hamilton demonstrated thorough understanding of the Laffer curve attributable to the fourteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun – the idea based on the economic concept of elasticity. The curve is usually used to demonstrate the concept of taxable income elasticity by setting tax rates at an optimum point. The concept advocates the reduction of tax rates to achieve that optimum level – the level after which any tax increase would actually decrease the revenue. Setting the tax rate too high, Hamilton held, would likely lead to the change of taxpayers’ attitude – either they would have no incentive to work or they would avoid paying taxes. This is the so-called rational economic model he was aware of when he wrote, “It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. . . . If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.” (Hamilton, A. (1787) Federalist: No. 21)

Hume’s influence, on the other hand, is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of factions. Hume’s assertion in 1748 that “…besides [this] difference of principle, those parties are very much fomented by a difference of interest, without which they could scarcely ever be dangerous or violent” (Of the Parties of Great Britain — The factions and their causes) influenced Madison who later suggested that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." (Federalist: No. 10) Madison also thought factions caused incompatibility, inequality and confusion.

Here we see again the moral authority of Plato and Aristotle who thought that pure democratic assertion of liberty and political equality threaten social cohesion as political life becomes fragmented due to factional disputes. They claimed that intensive conflict between sectional interests inevitably follows as each faction presses for its own advantage rather than that of the polis as a whole. This unrestrained desire and ambition leads to intrigue and internal political instability. All involved claim to represent the interests of the community, but all in fact represent themselves and a selfish lust for power. Those with wealth or a position of authority will be under attack and the conflict between rich and poor will reign. According to Plato and Aristotle this is the recipe for a disaster. As democracy dissolves, demagogues promise to crush all opposition and offer stability – it becomes a tempting option for citizenry to support a tyrant. This idea largely influenced the Federalists in the eighteenth century. It echoed in the words of Hamilton: “We are now forming a republican form of government. Real liberty is not found in the extremes of democracy… If we incline too much to democracy, we shall soon shoot into a monarchy, or some other form of dictatorship. ” Aristotle also said that political rule is the rule among equals, where everyone can rule and can be ruled. These were the understandings of equality taken on by the Founders, not that the government should make it so everyone is the exact same in every aspect.

The Federalists took seriously Machiavelli’s proposition of Republica that meant for them a form of government with the power-sharing provisions that would prevent autocratic rule. Machiavelli looked upon Livy who in ab Urbe condita livri claimed that the expansion of republican power owed to citizens’ respect for authority and to the modesty, fairness and nobility of mind. All this was in place when civic virtue presided over factionalism i.e. when the common business of citizens, conducted by citizens for summum bonum, prevailed over the pursuit of private interests in public affairs. In addition to the virtues and status of its citizenry, Machiavelli thought the vitality of Roman republics owed to the balance of institutions and mixed constitution, which prevented factionalism by ascribing limited roles to all main social forces.

Consequently, Democracy was not an option. Like Hobbes, the Federalists also held democracy to be equivalent to anarchy. After all, the Federalists belonged to the same European political tradition. Like Machiavelli and Rousseau, they were critical of the notion of democracy, which they associated with classical Athens. Moreover, in Rousseau’s view that largely influenced the framers of the Constitution, Athens could not be upheld as a political ideal because it failed to incorporate a clear division between legislative and executive functions thus becoming prone to instability. Madison, for example, argued that in a pure democracy, “…there is nothing to check the inducement to sacrifice the weaker party or the obnoxious individual … democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” (Madison, J. (1787) Federalist: No. 10) Owing to that, the draft of the Constitution attempted to constrain and confine the use of governmental power in a republican form of representative democracy. The republican principle of majority rule was to prevent minority faction to be voted into the position of power.

The object of the Constitution thus became to prevent fixed majority dictating the process of government. Madison put his faith in the United States, its size and the system of representation which would determine its government meant to that a successful majority would have to be composed of a coalition of interests which over time, would inevitably form and reform in different combinations. He argued that the Constitution would control factions by creating a competitive pluralist political system in which no one group of interests will be able to dominate the government. (Madison, J. (1787) Federalist: No. 10) He was the one who introduced a concept of checks and balances and competition of groups – pluralism based on rules of the free market of political ideas and interest. Even nowadays factions are embarrassed through the system that forces them to compete for power within very fragmented political arena. That system under certain circumstances occasionally creates uneasiness bringing the political process into a state of deadlock –the process becomes frozen and unable to function.

The Constitution that emerged at the Convention in Philadelphia in May 1787 was designed to meet the Federalist’s objectives and the state of a deadlock might have been one of them, although the notion that this was done intentionally is highly controversial. It formed two distinct levels of government institutions – one for states and one at the national level and further subdivided the powers allocated to the federal government such as the executive, legislative, judicial powers and the responsibilities of the presidency. The presidency was designed as an executive as well as legislative institution with the power of veto over bills passed by the Congress. Similarly, the Congress was given the possibility to influence the presidency.

Constitutional arrangements that divide the power between the President and the Congress have produced a system of government that is replete with veto points and represent just one of the sources of the deadlock beside the incapability to organize new political parties. The latter feature cannot be characterized to be controversial at all. Political parties were considered by the Federalists, who originally disliked them as a necessary evil, as a tool to establish control over the divide powers of the government. Even though the Constitution does not refer to political parties, the thesis that constitutional factors have affected the propensity for the third parties in the United States is very old one. In 1893, Engels placed this feature at the top of a list of variables preventing the growth of a third Workingmen Party, blaming the Constitution which causes any vote for any candidate not put up by one of two governing parties to appear to be lost (Letters to Americans ,Engels to Sorge, December 2, In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1953), New York, International Publishers, p. 258). For the time being, this unique American tradition has not changed. After all, Obamania testifies that the US Constitution is a living thing – a living vernacular tradition based upon the will of common people.

Aemilian Aemilianus, III Maius MMVII

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