Hey there fellow Obama supporters. I just had a long and feisty conversation with my neighbor, a conservative, that I have been close friends with for decades. We finally drilled down to, what seems to be the core issue where we differ in our choices in this election. He is having a very difficult time believing that what is happening in America to the middle class worker, could happen to him or his family. He thinks that if they just work harder, they will always be able to do well in this country. I hope I gave him something to think about. What if you are wrong? What if it could happen to your family, just like it has to the steel worker whose job was sent oversees? Can you really tell me that worker doesn't work hard, as hard as your family? That really brought him to an emotional quandry. We talked alot about liberalism, and the feared redistribution of wealth that conjures up in conservatives. I tried to explain, with many facts and studies, how this has already happened, in reverse.
I might have gotten him to at least think about it. I doubt he can come to terms with it between now and the election, but I have planted a seed. We talked about alot of things, from what it means to be an American, shared values, the constitution, Islamic Extremism and how to win that, military solutions vs a comprehensive effort, as well as what forces might actually be moving that problem, and who it benefits. We talked about lobbyists, ethics, and identity politics. It always came back to the economy. I think I was able to show him that globalization has changed the economic climate, who is a player, who has money in the markets, what values are at stake, who put the loopholes into the legislation and when and how. How some group of players have hijacked the conservative movement, the American economy, and the people of America. He is worried about his investments, his retirement accounts. It was intense, but I hope I at least got him thinking.
If it wasn't for spending this entire election season studying, reading diggs, following important issues, I never could have had this discussion, but, I am now thinking, maybe I am just too late. The emotional crux for him, was the idea that his party did this, or allowed it to happen on their watch, and that his family could be affected by it. He just couldn't go there. To him, this is just another election and America will go on like it has for the last 100 years. I might note that his family did fine during the depression, miraculously. He attributes that to "working harder" than other families did. Go figure. He had so much faith in GW Bush and the conservative congress that took over in 2000, that he has a really hard time believing that maybe they played him, or just lost control.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/06/09/ST2008060900950.html
Obama and McCain Tax ProposalsAccording to a new analysis by the Tax Policy Center, a joint project of the Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican John McCain are both proposing tax plans that would result in cuts for most American families. Obama's plan gives the biggest cuts to those who make the least, while McCain would give the largest cuts to the very wealthy. For the approximately 147,000 families that make up the top 0.1 percent of the income scale, the difference between the two plans is stark. While McCain offers a $269,364 tax cut, Obama would raise their taxes, on average, by $701,885 - a difference of nearly $1 million.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/how_to_redeploy.html
Center for American Progress
By Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, Peter Juul | August 11, 2008
Read the full report (pdf)
Video: How to Redeploy
Some have asserted that a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq will take two years or more, but we believe it is not only possible, but necessary, to conduct a safe and responsible redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq in no more than 10 months. Our military can accomplish such a task, should it be assigned, if it uses all elements of U.S. military power, focused on our land forces’ proficiencies in maneuver warfare and logistics.
There is significant disagreement and confusion about the time necessary to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. Proponents of an indefinite U.S. military presence in Iraq have asserted that a withdrawal of over 140,000 American troops and equipment would be fraught with risk, uncertainty, and overwhelming logistical complications. According to a recent ABC News piece, several commanders in Iraq stated that there was “no way” a withdrawal of one to two brigades per month could work logistically—although none of them agreed to be quoted on the record.
The debate over how to conduct an American withdrawal has gravitated back and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid, precipitous withdrawal, and those advocating for a long, drawn-out redeployment. Many who argue for an extended redeployment over several years do so simply in order to “stay the course” in Iraq, and cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for an extended U.S. presence.
Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false choice. Both options are logistically feasible, but this report will demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over an 8 to 10 month period. This report, written in consultation with military planners and logistics experts, is not intended to serve as a playbook for our military planners; it is a guide to policymakers and the general public about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely daunting—but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of the U.S. military.
It is necessary now more than ever for the United States to commit to a responsible phased withdrawal. This must be done because, as many analysts have noted, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has produced several unintended consequences. A large and indefinite military presence in Iraq has allowed Al Qaeda and the Taliban to reconstitute itself, diverted U.S. attention from the war in Afghanistan, weakened the United States’ ability to project its hard and soft power around the world, and strengthened Iranian influence throughout the greater Middle East.
The latest unintended consequence is widespread Iraqi opposition to the seemingly indefinite American troop presence. The Bush administration’s positions on the bilateral Status of Forces and Strategic Framework Agreements has created a broad Iraqi political consensus in favor of a U.S. commitment to withdraw its forces from the country.
Recent calls from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, his cabinet, and the majority of the Iraqi Parliament for a specific timetable for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq represents the beginning of a broad cross-sectarian parliamentary bloc that could provide the organizing principles for accommodation in the short term and eventual reconciliation. No such consensus yet exists among Iraqis as to what the new Iraq will be, but broad consensus does exist around the belief that no genuine, sustainable Iraqi unity can develop while the Iraqi government continues to be underwritten by a large foreign military presence.
Despite Maliki’s many statements supporting a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal, many supporters of remaining in Iraq mistakenly argue that Maliki is just pandering to his constituents. Many of these same people thought we would be greeted as liberators when we invaded and occupied Iraq, ignoring the fact that resistance to foreigners is an integral part of Iraq’s national identity and that it is the Iraqis, not the United States, that will determine their fate.
The United States must therefore move beyond a discussion about the effect of the surge, and seize this opportunity offered by the Iraqis to take control of their own security by beginning a responsible phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq. Such a withdrawal gives the United States the best opportunity to achieve its goals in Iraq and advance overall U.S. security interests in the greater Middle East.
Iraqi leaders are increasingly eager and able to take over their own affairs. Unlike during the Iraqi elections in 2005, scores of Sunni political parties are preparing to run in the provincial elections originally scheduled for this fall, and Iraqi Security Forces have taken the lead in several operations from Mosul to Basra. Lt. Gen. James Dubik, the American officer currently in charge of training Iraq’s security forces, told Congress last month that the Iraqi Army and police will be ready to assume responsibility for Iraq’s internal security as early as April 2009.
Those opposed to a timetable for withdrawal make the argument that setting such a timetable will undermine the gains made by the surge of 30,000 American troops into Iraq in the first half of 2007. According to Gen. David Petraeus, the situation in Iraq is too volatile to project a withdrawal date. In fact, Petraeus has it exactly backward. It is not listening to the Iraqi government that will endanger the gains we have made in the last year.
There can be no doubt that violence has reached its lowest levels since 2004, but supporters of maintaining an indefinite American troop presence in Iraq attribute the current reduction in violence solely to the simple increase in American combat forces and ignore other factors that have contributed to today’s improved security environment. These other factors were either directly linked to the prospect of an American withdrawal or had nothing to do with the surge in the first place. Not setting a date will actually undermine these gains.
The recent decline in violence in Iraq from the record levels of 2006 and early 2007 is due in large part to the emergence of Sunni “awakening” groups and Sons of Iraq militias. These groups were co-opted by U.S. forces in the early fall of 2006, long before the surge even began, and were in part a response to the widespread belief by Sunni’s in Anbar that the United States would not be remaining in Iraq indefinitely.
According to commanders on the ground, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal was the main impetus for Sunni cooperation. Major General John Allen, a Marine Commander in Anbar, has stated that the rising pro-withdrawal sentiment in the United States, which was reflected in the victory in the 2006 midterm election of pro-withdrawal candidates, had a major effect on the Sunnis. According to Allen, the election “did not go unnoticed....They talked about it all the time.” He went on to say that the Marines in Anbar, “from top to bottom, reinforced the message sent by the [2006 election results] by saying, ‘We are leaving.... We don’t know when we are leaving, but we don’t have much time, so you [the Anbaris] better get after this.’”
Brigadier Gen. Sean McFarland, who had been a colonel in command of the Army’s First Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in Al Anbar province from January 2006 until January 2007, credited the “growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias [which] made these younger [Sunni] leaders open to our overtures” as the main reason for the turn around in Al Anbar.
In other words, the Sunni Awakening forces began cooperating with U.S. forces in late 2006 because they believed we were leaving. The perception that we will main¬tain a large presence in Iraq indefinitely will endanger this cooperation.
The unilateral standdown of Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army, which began in February 2007, was also key to reducing violence. This development, like the co-option of the “Sons of Iraq” militias, was not a result of the U.S. troop build-up, nor was it instigated by the Iraqi government. It had much more to do with Sadr positioning himself for the upcoming election.
While Sadr’s power and influence have been weakened over the past year, his political movement still remains popular among many Shiites, and the cleric still possesses a military wing, the Jaish al-Mahdi, which is capable of causing problems for the government of Prime Minister Maliki and his supporters in Parliament—the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa Party. Absent a timetable for withdrawal, this struggle for power can become violent again.
Surge proponents point to the marked drop in ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, as a reason for maintaining the Bush administration’s current policy. Yet this decline in violence resulted as much from the completion of ethnic and sectarian cleansing and the near homogenization of Baghdad neighborhoods as from the U.S. troop build-up.
The surge proponents’ final claim, that recent troop reductions are what President Bush calls “a return on success,” is also misguided. The surge of combat troops ended not because of conditions on the ground, but because the Pentagon could not maintain 20 brigades in Iraq and keep the current level of forces in Afghanistan without extending the tours of the surge brigades by more than 15 months.
But debating how much the escalation of 30,000 troops was responsible for the current levels of violence in Iraq is beside the point. The real issue is where do we go from here.
The reduction in violence has produced a tenuous security balance in Iraq, but it has not yet resulted in the kind of sustainable equilibrium that locks in the security and political gains that have been made in the country. Absent an incentive to truly take over their own affairs, the Iraqi government has not made satisfactory progress toward national reconciliation, nor have they implemented critical power or revenue sharing laws.
In fact, a continued large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq has allowed Iraq’s warring factions to stall on making the tough choices that they would have to make if faced with a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. Provincial elections, originally scheduled for October 2008, are a case in point, as they are not likely to take place this year.
The United States can truly take advantage of what security gains have been made over the last 18 months by using a withdrawal timetable as a lever to force political change in Iraq, while pushing Iraq’s competing powers to recalculate their self-interest in light of a U.S. withdrawal. By putting the Iraqi government and its neighbors on notice that they—not the United States—will be responsible for the consequences of any instability in Iraq, the United States will give all players involved an incentive to begin acting constructively in Iraq.
President Bush and his supporters, undeterred, continue to reject setting a timetable for withdrawal. The White House justified a recent agreement that sets a vaguely worded “general time horizon for withdrawal,” by asserting that the “success” of the surge necessitates an indefinite large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq. This is the wrong course.
In order to solidify recent security gains and bring about meaningful reconciliation, the United States must move beyond the surge and begin a withdrawal of all American troops as soon as possible from Iraq. This is what the majority of the American people and the Iraqi people want.
Withdrawal will not only improve the chances of stabilizing the region; it will allow the United States to reset its entire Middle East policy. Over the past seven years, U.S. influence throughout the greater Middle East has diminished to such a degree that we are no longer liked, feared, or respected.
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http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/09/iraq_transition.html
Increased security gained in Iraq over the last two years has been purchased through a number of choices that have worked against achieving meaningful political reconciliation.
By Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, Peter Juul | September 10, 2008
Victory in Iraq Declared, Not Achieved, by Brian Katulis
The 2007-2008 surge of U.S. troops achieved important gains in reducing violence in Iraq. But it has not delivered on its central objective: achieving a sustainable power consolidation among Iraq’s different political forces. The surge has frozen into place the accelerated fragmentation that Iraq underwent in 2006 and 2007 and has created disincentives to bridge central divisions between Iraqi factions.
The common refrain that the surge has produced military success that has not been matched by political progress fundamentally misrepresents the nature of Iraq’s political evolution. The increased security achieved over the last two years has been purchased through a number of choices that have worked against achieving meaningful political reconciliation. The reductions in violence in 2007 and 2008 have, in fact, made true political accommodation in Iraq more elusive, contrary to the central theory of the surge.
Rather than advancing Iraq’s political transition and facilitating power-sharing deals among Iraq’s factions, the surge has produced an oil revenue-fueled, Shia-dominated national government with close ties to Iran. This national government shows few signs of seeking to compromise and share meaningful power with other frustrated political factions. The surge has set up a political house of cards. But this does not mean that the U.S. military must stay longer to avoid its collapse. Quite the contrary: Without a U.S. military drawdown, Iraq will not be able to achieve the true internal consolidation of power necessary to advance U.S. security interests in the Middle East.
Now that the last surge brigades are gone, Iraq’s government is demanding a strict timeline for the departure of U.S. troops, and U.S. policy in Iraq is moving toward an inevitable transition, it is time to take stock of Iraq’s internal politics
Iraq’s internal politics today are a complicated mosaic of competing interests and contradictory trends. Five enduring, unresolved tensions lie beneath the surface, each capturing a part but none the entirety of the political dynamics of post-surge Iraq.
1. Centralizers vs. de-centralizers. Some Iraqi factions want to see more power placed in the hands of the national government, while others continue to push for more power to be vested in local and provincial governments.
2. State power holders vs. popular challengers. Certain factions have disproportionately benefited from the national government’s spoils, such as Dawa, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Kurdish factions who are part of national government. Some factions that have not benefited from the national government’s increased oil wealth and military power have stronger support in key areas of Iraq such as the Sons of Iraq in central and western Iraq and the Sadrists in central and southern Iraq.
3. Sunni vs. Shia. Sectarian conflicts are much reduced since high levels of violence in 2006, but the Sunni-Shia sectarian strain endures.
4. Arab vs. Kurds. The Arab-Kurd division is coming to a head in the unresolved crisis over the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories.
5. Religious factions vs. secular factions. Latent tensions remain between Iraqis who are concerned by the religious nature of Iraqi politics versus those who see politics as one facet of advancing enduring religious principles of either Sunni or Shia Islam. Religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis have suffered from persecution at the hands of other groups in Iraq since 2003.
The five persistent fault lines are present in the three major alliances and political groups that continue to evolve in Iraq: the fragmenting Shia-Kurdish coalition that has ruled Iraq, the transformations in Sunni politics, and the still fledgling efforts of nationalist and secular groups.
Iraq will need to overcome numerous hurdles in its political transition before the end of 2009, including two elections and a long list of unresolved power-sharing questions. Not all of the 10 key challenges outlined in this report are of equal magnitude—failure to resolve some would likely lead to major, systemic crisis, while failure on others would simply be suboptimal. Yet all are interconnected, and none have been resolved by the security improvements of the last 18 months or will be meaningfully addressed simply by postponing U.S. troop withdrawals. Ten key challenges ahead for Iraq’s political transition include:
1. The U.S.-Iraq security agreement2. Provincial powers and elections3. Refugees and internally displaced persons4. Disbanding and integrating militias and other armed groups5. Constitutional review6. Kirkuk and other disputed territories and Article 1407. De-Baathification reform implementation8. Amnesty implementation9. Oil and revenue sharing laws10. State capacity, governance, and anti-corruption
These are all issues that Iraq’s leaders must address on their own terms, and at their own pace. The United States cannot impose a military solution to the power-sharing disputes among Iraq’s leaders, and expending significant resources in an effort to do so is unwise while other pressing national security challenges loom in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. True progress in Iraq requires the United States to acknowledge the increasing moves by Iraqis to assert sovereignty and control over their own affairs.
Most analyses tend to assume that the United States is the principal driver of events in Iraq. From this perspective, Iraqi political progress will only be achieved under constant U.S. pressure, which would make withdrawing troops and reducing U.S. power on the ground a self-defeating proposition. But this perspective is dangerously backward, since the primary drivers of Iraqi politics are Iraqis, and a stable political order must rest on the alignment of their interests and not the exercise of U.S. willpower or tinkering
The U.S. military presence in Iraq is not politically neutral. It creates a distinct set of incentives for political actors that directly work against the reconciliation that U.S. diplomats try to promote. U.S. military dominance and support absolves the major political actors from having to make the tough decisions necessary to achieve a power-sharing equilibrium.
In the months ahead in Iraq, the United States will have to distinguish between those outcomes that are truly catastrophic and those that are simply suboptimal given the limits on U.S. leverage over Iraqi actors—leverage that declines each day as the Iraqi government becomes financially self-sufficient and more assertive. Iraq’s leaders over the next year will increasingly demand greater control over their own affairs. The United States needs to rebalance its overall national security approach by stepping outside of the trenches of intra-Iraqi disputes over power and putting the focus back on its core national security interests.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/09/supply_side.html
Center For American Progress
Francisco Brum, who worked at the Prince pasta plant for 25 years, walks past the factory for perhaps the last time after it closed, putting 300 employees out of work.
By Michael Ettlinger, John S. Irons | September 12, 2008
The first supply-side era in modern economic history began in earnest in 1981 with huge tax cuts for the wealthy and corporations. Although there were modest steps back from these tax cuts in the ensuing years in response to fiscal deficits and tax-sheltering, this first supply-side era didn’t end until the tax hikes of 1993. This respite from supply-side policies ended in 2001, however, when a new set of supply-side tax measures were enacted. Today, as budget shortfalls mount and the economy weakens, the supply-side approach to economic policy is once again up for debate. This paper reviews the theory underlying supply-side tax cuts and examines their results.
The term “supply-side” comes from the idea that economic policy, and tax policy in particular, can influence private-sector production decisions by changing the incentives to work or to invest. Like many ideologies pushed to an extreme, supply-side theory does contain a kernel of truth: In certain circumstances lower tax rates can lead to additional economic activity and can lead to additional government revenue. This is a standard incite in public economic theory. But, it is equally true that in other circumstances lower tax rates do not lead to additional economic activity or government revenue.
The chain of logic for supply-side policies to work requires the following. Lower tax rates on savings (or on those who save more) leads to higher saving rates. Higher saving leads to more economic investments and greater capital accumulation. Finally, more capital leads to greater economic growth. At each of these steps, however, there is reason to doubt the theory—there are other possible outcomes and conflicting theories.
The efficacy of supply-side policies thus becomes an empirical question: Do they work? As importantly, do they work better than alternative approaches of greater public investment to stimulate our economy? The two supply-side eras that sandwich the period from 1993 to 2001 offer us an opportunity to assess the impact of supply-side policies. The claims for these policies have been great, yet the results have been meager. Specifically:
Of course, the reason for the failures of the supply-side periods to deliver as strong an economic performance as the 1993 to 2001 era may not have anything to do with tax policy. Other short-term factors and long-term trends influence the economy as well. The evidence that supply-side tax cuts help economic growth is, however, weak at best and much contradicted in the economic literature. As the data we present in the pages that follow shows, economic policies with tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy as their centerpiece have simply failed to produce strong economic growth by a variety of measures.
http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/9/13/6399/12740/832/597158
I wrote a scolding rant yesterday titled ENOUGH! of "The Masses are Asses". That evoked a discussion of reason, specifically, what the term "reasonable" means. Some commenters cited to dictionary.com or other similar sources. Were my diary an everyday conversation, those definitions might apply. But it was not, and they don't. So ...
Herewith a primer on Reason, in the context of political discourse:
Okay ... back to the beginning....
"Reason" - set down as the highest civic virtue by Aristotle in The Politics - is not the same as "logic." And Aristotle should know, as it was he who codified what we call logic, and he used reason to mean something different.
Note - Please don't reply with the dictionary definitions, because these are terms-of-art in political discourse, and have been since the time of Aristotle. In this discourse I'm using Aristotle's meanings, and not Miriam Webster's.If you've not read The Politics and you don't feel qualified to debate the terms-of-art as used in it, that's fine. But don't tell me these terms-of-art mean something else, so we can debate based on the definitions you're comfortable with. That's equivocating ... and it's a logical fallacy.
Note - Please don't reply with the dictionary definitions, because these are terms-of-art in political discourse, and have been since the time of Aristotle. In this discourse I'm using Aristotle's meanings, and not Miriam Webster's.
If you've not read The Politics and you don't feel qualified to debate the terms-of-art as used in it, that's fine. But don't tell me these terms-of-art mean something else, so we can debate based on the definitions you're comfortable with. That's equivocating ... and it's a logical fallacy.
Logic is a formal process of syllogisms, which are built of relational premises, givens, and conclusions. A simple example:
P: If A is true, then B is true. G: A is true. C: B is true.
That is a valid logical argument, in that it follows the forms and rules of logic. But is the conclusion (B is true) True? Actually, we don't know. We've neither tested the premise (it may be faulty) nor verified the given (it may be in error). Example:
P: If Tom is a Republican, then Mary is a Democrat. G: Tom is a Republican. C: Mary is a Democrat.
That is a valid logical argument. But is it True? We don't know. Do we have some reason to believe that Tom and Mary belong to different parties (thus testing the premise), and evidence that Tom is, in fact, a Republican (verifying the given)? If not, it's an elegant logical argument - and it's valid - but we can't say it's True.
Enter reason, stage left, introduced by Chorus.
Reason, as a civic virtue propounded by Aristotle, is the application of logic, evidence, and shared value-judgments to reach decisions. Such reasoned decisions are most likely to be: (a) agreeable among the body politic; and, (b) reliable in terms of their stated goals.
The "body politic" does not necessarily mean all citizens. Aristotle did not set down democracy as the touchstone of civic virtue. Aristotle set down reason as the touchstone of civic virtue. Specifically, a city will be virtuous if guided by reason. That could mean a reasonable king, or a reasonable aristocracy, or a reasonable oligarchy, or a reasonable democracy. The key is not the form of government, but that it is reasonable, that it makes policy based on logic, evidence, and shared value-judgments.
Indeed, Aristotle cautioned that democracy was a dangerous form of government, because it could very easily give way to mob rule - based on appeals to passion - forfeiting the virtuous legitimacy of reason. The idea that democracy is a priori superior as a form of government is not supported by reason or by history. Democracy is only virtuous if the body politic are reasonable (above).
Note that logic, evidence, and shared value-judgments are different and distinct elements of reason in Aristotle's usage. I talked about logic above.
Evidence, in this usage, can be defined as "tested or observable facts or circumstances that make a claim more or less likely to be true." Evidence need not be conclusive; it need only make the claim more or less likely to be true. And when it comes to civic policy, we often won't have conclusive evidence ("proof"), by the nature of the information sought. Which brings us to....
Value-judgments. Value-judgments are not logic, and they are not evidence. They are first premises of the form "I value A over B," and are the scales by which we weigh uncertainties: risks and rewards. Value-judgments are arbitrary, in that we cannot prove one value-judgment one superior to another except by reference to other value-judgments, and those referents will inevitably share the same epistemic limits. Any attempt to "prove" a value-judgment will ultimately devolve to either: (a) a bare statement of preference; or, (b) a loop of self-supporting bare preferences.
That last is key. To be reasonable, the body politic (leaders) must apply shared value-judgments. The problem is that most of our value-judgments are invisible even to us. We think we are applying "logic and evidence," when in fact we're applying "logic, evidence, and value-judgments." By leaving value-judgments out of the commonly described elements of reason, we render them invisible. We take them off the menu of discourse and start to think, talk, and act as if arbitrary value-judgments were like facts but even moreso - "writ large on the cosmos," in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
And thus we get "as any damned fool could plainly see" style discourse. Because when it comes to reasoning, value-judgments are more salient than logic or evidence. They are the most important links in the chain of reason, as they set our standards for evaluating evidence, uncertainty, risk, and reward. That's how two people can look at the same raw data and reach completely opposing conclusions ... both entirely reasonable!
So we can have useful discourse, even if we disagree on core value-judgments ... but only if we put those value-judgments on the table for discussion. That means we must both:
Not the value-judgments we wish they had, those easiest to rebut or deride, but the value-judgments they actually use. And then, we must:
In doing that last, we must remain aware that our value-judgments are every bit as arbitrary as the other person's. We might be wrong, and even if we are certain of our rightness, our rightness might not be worthy of our stubbornness. Justice Learned Hand, one of America's foremost jurists, wrote this of Oliver Cromwell's famous plea for reason before the Battle of Dunbar:
I should like to have that written over the portals of every church, every school, and every courthouse and, may I say, of every legislative body in the United States. I should like to have every court begin: "I beseech ye, in the bowels of Christ, that we might be mistaken."
Something to remember the next time you're tempted to argue that "The Masses are Asses."
http://mccainsource.com/homefront?id=0007
McCain Hub
McSame As Bush On The Domestic Policy
Progressive Media USA Research PUBLISHED: June 03, 2008
McSame on...
Bush Administration
McCain
... Personal Savings Accounts
... Claiming To Reach Across The Aisle
... Claiming To Balance To Budget
... Tax Cuts Increasing Revenue
... Fiscal Discipline
... Eroding Employer Based Healthcare
... Opposing Health Care For Children
McCain Voted Against Providing Insurance For Millions Of Uninsured Children. In August 2007, McCain voted against passage of H.R. 976, which would have reauthorized the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). According to Knight Ridder, "The Senate proposal would provide coverage to 3.2 million" uninsured children and renew coverage for the 6 million children already covered by the program. The legislation passed 68-31. [H.R. 976, Vote #307, 8/2/07; Knight Ridder, 8/2/07]
McCain Said Bush's Veto Of Health Care For Children Was The "Right Call." During an interview on CNN's "The Situation Room," John McCain was asked about Bush's veto of health care for children. McCain said, "It's a right call by the president. It's the phony smoke and mirrors way of paying for it." [CNN, "The Situation Room," 10/3/07]
... Universal Health Care
... Personal Responsibility
... Eliminating Choice
... Tax Breaks For Big Oil
... No Child Left Behind
... The Environment
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My heart just sinks every time some well-meaning (but ignorant) Obama supporter calls into a radio show and gets heckled by Sean Hannity or whoever about Barack Obama's legislative accomplishments.
This happened just yesterday. Hannity offered an Obama supporter a steak dinner if he could name three pieces of legislation that had Obama's name on them. The caller clumsily changed the subject.
Sensing he had the caller on the ropes, Hannity lowered the bar to a single piece of legislation. And alas, the caller could not name the legislation.
Hannity smugly switched off the caller's volume and said directly to the audience, "Ladies and Gentlemen, checkmate." And Droogie exited his car, entered his house and ate tacos sadly.
Listen, I know how talk radio works. Even if he had been able to list three pieces of legislation, Hannity still would have badgered the caller about William Ayers and Jeremiah Wright.
Hannity is not the issue. The issue is that ordinary people are being told that Obama has a thin resume and has accomplished very little in his Senate career. I have a Republican co-worker who I spar back and forth with on this issue.
Even when I told him of one bill, he said, "Well, that's probably the only bill." It's never enough for some people, but that doesn't mean you should go into the world uninformed.
So here are just a few highlights from Barack Obama's career as a Senator: specific pieces of legislation, what they meant and how they were passed.
The Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act Introduced by Sen. John McCain in May 2005, and cosponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy. Barack Obama added three amendments to this bill.
While the bill was never voted on in the Senate, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Acts of 2006 and 2007, respectively, drew heavily upon the wording of this bill.
The Lugar-Obama Cooperative Threat Reduction. Introduced by Sen. Barack Obama, Sen. Dick Lugar and Sen. Tom Coburn.
First introduced in November 2005 and enacted in 2007, this bill expanded upon the successful Nunn-Lugar threat reduction, which helped secure weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.
Lugar-Obama expanded this nonproliferation program to conventional weapons -- including shoulder-fired rockets and land mines. When the bill received $48 million in funding, Obama said, "This funding will further strengthen our ability to detect and intercept illegal shipments of weapons and materials of mass destruction, enhancing efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism."
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 This act of Congress, introduced by Senators Obama and Coburn, required the full disclosure of all entities or organizations receiving federal funds in FY2007.
Despite a "secret hold" on this bill by Senators Ted Stevens and Robert Byrd, the act passed into law and was signed by President Bush. The act had 43 cosponsors, including John McCain.
The act created this Web site, which provides citizens with valuable information about government-funded programs.
Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
This law helped specify US policy toward the Congo, and states that the US should work with other donor nations to increase international contributions to the African nation.
The bill marked the first federal legislation to be enacted with Obama as its primary sponsor. Following this legislation's passage, Obama toured Africa, traveling to South Africa, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Chad. He spoke forcefully against ethnic rivalries and political corruption in Kenya.
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act In the first month of the 110th Congress, Obama worked with Sen. Russ Feingold to pass this law, which amends and strengthens the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.
Specificially, the changes made by Obama and Feingold requires public disclosure of lobbying activity and funding, places more restrictions on gifts for members of Congress and their staff, and provides for mandatory disclosure of earmarks in expenditure bills.
The House passed the bill, 411-8, on July 31. The Senate approved it, 83-14, on Aug. 2. At the time, Obama called it "the most sweeping ethics reform since Watergate."
Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act
Following the Republican-sponsored voter intimidation tactics seen in mostly black counties in Maryland during the 2006 midterm elections, Obama worked with Sen. Chuck Schumer to introduce this bill.
The bill has been referred to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Obama said of the bill, "This legislation would ensure that for the first time, these incidents are fully investigated and that those found guilty are punished."
The Obama-McCain Climate Change Reduction Bill
The Obama-McCain bill, which is co-sponsored by Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., would cut emissions by two-thirds by 2050.
Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007
Introduced by Obama, this binding act would stop the planned troop increase of 21,500 in Iraq, and would also begin a phased redeployment of troops from Iraq with the goal of removing all combat forces by March 31, 2008.
Explaining the bill, Obama said it reflects his view that the problems in Iraq do not have a military solution. "Our troops have performed brilliantly in Iraq, but no amount of American soldiers can solve the political differences at the heart of somebody else's civil war," Obama said.
Amendments to the 2008 Defense Authorization Bill
Obama worked with Sen. Kit Bond to limit, through this bill, the Pentagon’s use of personality disorder discharges in the FY 2008 Defense Authorization bill.
This provision would add additional safeguards to discharge procedures and require a thorough review by the Government Accountability Office. This followed news reports that the Pentagon inappropriately used these procedures to discharge service members with service-connected psychological injuries.
"With thousands of American service members suffering day in and day out from the less visible wounds of war, reports that the Pentagon has improperly diagnosed and discharged service members with personality disorders are deeply disturbing," said Senator Obama. "This provision will add additional safeguards to the Department of Defense’s use of this discharge and mandate a comprehensive review of these policies."
The Comprehensive Nuclear Threat Reduction provision
Working with Sen. Hagel and Rep. Adam Schiff, Obama authored this provision, which would require the president to develop a comprehensive plan for ensuring that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material at vulnerable sites around the world are secure by 2012 from the threats that terrorists have shown they can pose.
A provision from the Obama-Hagel bill was passed by Congress in December 2007 as an amendment to the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill.
"It is imperative that we build and sustain a truly global effort under an aggressive timeline to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material to keep them out of the wrong hands. The comprehensive nuclear threat reduction plan required by this provision is an important step in that effort," Obama said of the provision.
These are just a selection of the bills that Obama has introduced and co-sponsored. You owe it to yourself to be able to cite a few of these off the top of your heads so you can give people the gist of them when they challenge the Senator's accomplishments.
At the end of the day, I will take Obama's good judgment over McCain's longevity in Washington any day of the week. It's more important for a politician to learn from his or her mistakes than it is for them to present the same old failed ideas over and over and expecting a better result.
It's true Obama is a relative newcomer on the politican scene, but he has already accomplished much in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, government accountability, environmental responsibility and others.
So get out there and let some people know what our guy is capable of. Don't be caught unaware when someone asks you for your candidate's resume!
Obama's Organization, and the Future of American PoliticsBy Micah L. Sifry, 06/08/2008 - 10:12pm
http://www.techpresident.com/blog/entry/26265/obama_s_organization_and_the_future_of_american_politics
Barack Obama's victory over Hillary Clinton is the first time an insurgent has beaten the establishment candidate in the Democratic primaries since Jimmy Carter in 1976. This is interesting and important for all kinds of reasons. One, as I've written before, is that it suggests that the era of Big Money and Big Media pre-selecting the nominee of the Democratic party may well be over, in no small part because of the affordances brought by the internet: lower costs of communication and collaboration, and less allowances for hypocrisy and dishonesty in campaigns.
But there's another big reason why Obama's victory is so important. He is riding herd on the largest and most potent new political organization anyone has seen on the American landscape in at least sixteen years. He's probably got anywhere from four to eight million email addresses on top of his 1.5 million donors and 800,000 registered users of my.barackobama.com, his social networking platform.
What happens with this organization if Obama wins? What will he do with it? And what will it do with him? For us here at techPresident, a website that is focused on how the candidates are using the web, and the web is using them, by the time November rolls around, this could be the billion-dollar question.
continued...
Joshua Generation Project
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/03/04/selma_voting_rights_march_comm.php
http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/388366.aspx
A word or phrase that has special meaning in a particular context.
A term of art is a word or phrase that has a particular meaning. Terms of art abound in the law. For example, the phrase double jeopardy can be used in common parlance to describe any situation that poses two risks. In the law, double jeopardy refers specifically to an impermissible second trial of a defendant for the same offense that gave rise to the first trial.
The classification of a word or phrase as a term of art can have legal consequences. In Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 112 S. Ct. 711, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992), Shirley M. Molzof brought suit against the federal government after her husband, Robert E. Molzof, suffered irreversible brain damage while under the care of government hospital workers. The federal government conceded liability, and the parties tried the issue of damages before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Molzof had brought the claim as executor of her husband's estate under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 [1988]), which prohibits the assessment of punitive damages against the federal government. The court granted recovery to Molzof for her husband's injuries that resulted from the negligence of federal employees, but it denied recovery for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life. According to the court, such damages were punitive damages, which could not be recovered against the federal government.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial court, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, punitive damages is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning under state law. Congress was aware of this meaning at the time it passed the FTCA. Under traditional common-law principles, punitive damages are designed to punish a party. Since damages for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life were meant to compensate Molzof rather than punish the government, the Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit.
